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Abstract
Recently, Li et al. [Phys. Rev. A, 82(2), 022303] presented two semi-quantum secret
sharing (SQSS) protocols using GHZ-like states. The proposed schemes are rather practi-
cal because only the secret dealer requires to equip with advanced quantum devices such
as quantum memory, whereas the other agents can merely perform classical operations to
complete the secret sharing. However, this study points out that a security pitfall exists in
the eavesdropping check phase of both schemes that could mount to an Intercept-resend
attack and a Trojan horse attack on the two schemes, respectively, to disclose the other
agent’s shadow, and further to reveal the master key of the SQSS, which contradicts to the
security requirement of a QSS. Fortunately, two possible solutions are proposed to avoid
this security pitfall.
keywords: Quantum secret sharing, GHZ-like state, Intercept-resend attack, Trojan
horse attack
1 Introduction
Since the first quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol was presented by Mark et al.’s via triplet
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state in 1999 [1], lots of QSS schemes have also been
proposed [2-13]. The main goal of a QSS is to distribute a secret among several agents based
on the quantum mechanics. Only when enough subsets of legitimate agents cooperate can the
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secret be recovered. On the contrary, any agent alone is not able to acquire the dealer’s secret
by his/her own shadow. A secure QSS should be able to avoid the attack from both an outside
eavesdropper and an inside malicious user.
Recently, Li et al. proposed two novel semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocols via
triplet GHZ-like state [13]. According to their definition, the term “semi-quantum” implies
that the secret dealer is a powerful quantum server, whereas the other agents are all classical
clients. More precisely, the secret dealer has the ability to perform the following operations:
(1) preparing GHZ-like state, (2) performing the Bell measurement and the three-qubit joint
measurement, (3) storing photons in a short-term quantum memory. As for the classical
agents, they are restricted to perform the following operations over the quantum channel: (1)
preparing new qubits in the classical basis {|0〉, |1〉}, (2) measuring photons in the classi-
cal basis, (3) reordering the photons via different delay lines, (4) sending or reflecting the
qubits without disturbance. Since the classical basis only considers the qubit |0〉 and |1〉, the
other quantum superpositions of single photon are not included here. Therefore, the agents’
operations above are equivalent to the traditional {0, 1} computation.
The two protocols proposed by Li et al. [13] are namely the randomization-based SQSS
and the measure-resend SQSS, respectively. Both schemes are based on the entanglement cor-
relation of GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉)= 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉),
which can be easily generated by performing the Hadamard gate H (= 1√2 (|0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|+
|1〉〈0|− |1〉〈1|)) on each qubit of the standard GHZ state |Ψ1〉= 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉). Under
the three-party QSS scenario, it can be seen that if each party holds the 1st, the 2nd, and the
3rd particle of a GHZ-like state, respectively, then their classical-basis measurements (say
MR1, MR2, and MR3) will agree to a secret sharing relationship: MR1 = MR2 ⊕MR3, where
the measurement result is encoded as ’0’ if |0〉, ’1’ if |1〉.
However, this study attempts to show that under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss
and two agents) of Li et al.’s scheme, a malicious agent is possible to launch an Intercept-
resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS and a Trojan horse attack [14, 15, 16, 17] on
the measure-resend SQSS to reveal the other agent’s shadow. This contradicts to the security
requirements of a QSS. Fortunately, the above problems can be respectively solved by a
carefully designed eavesdropping check process and the use of some special optical devices
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that filter out the spy photons of the Trojan horse attacks.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews Li et al.’s two SQSS
schemes via GHZ-like state. Section 3 points out the problem and gives two solutions to
remedy the loophole. Finally, Section 4 gives a brief conclusion to the result.
2 Review of Li et al.’s SQSS schemes
In this section, a brief review of Li et al.’s two SQSS schemes is given. The only difference be-
tween these two schemes is the definition of the classical agent’s ability. For a randomization-
based SQSS protocol, classical agents are limited to perform operations: (2), (3), and (4),
while in a measure-resend protocol, classical agents are limited to perform operations: (1),
(2), and (4), as defined in Sec. 1.
2.1 Randomization-based SQSS protocol
In this subsection, the SQSS is considered under a three-party scenario as follows. Suppose a
boss Alice wants to share a secret with her two agents: Bob and Charlie. She splits her secret
key KA into two pieces of shadow key: KB and KC, which will deliver to Bob and Charlie,
respectively. Only when Bob and Charlie collaborate can KA be recovered. The procedure of
the randomization-based SQSS can be described in the following steps:
Step 1. Alice first prepares N triplet GHZ-like states all in |ψ ′〉= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉).
Here, the quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉} can be classically measured by Z basis. Then, she
divides these N GHZ-like states into three sequences SA, SB, and SC, which include the
1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd particles of all GHZ-like states, respectively. After the above
preparation, Alice retains the quantum sequence SA, and sends the sequence SB to Bob,
SC to Charlie.
Step 2. When Bob and Charlie receive the photons, respectively, they choose to adopt either
the SHARE mode or the CHECK mode on each qubit, respectively. In the SHARE
mode, the agent performs a Z-basis measurement on the qubit, whereas in the CHECK
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mode, the agent reflects the qubit back to Alice. Notice that those returned qubits in
the CHECK mode are reordered via different delay lines.
Step 3. Alice stores the reflected qubits from Bob and Charlie in a short-term quantum mem-
ory, and publicly announces the reception of these photon sequences. After that, Bob
and Charlie publish the correct order of the reflected qubits, and their original positions
in the sequences delivered by Alice, respectively. According to the agents’ reports,
Alice can recover the reflected qubits into the correct order.
Step 4. For each GHZ-like state, both Bob and Charlie announce their decisions respectively
on the corresponding two particles of SB and SC, which can be one of the four cases as
shown in Table 1. Then, Alice can perform one of the four actions on the corresponding
qubits as depicted in Table 1.
Step 5. For the eavesdropping check, those qubits in cases (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1 are pub-
licly discussed. The involved parties have to publish their measurement results in those
cases to see whether each corresponding three qubits is consistent to the correlation of a
GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉 (= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉) = 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉)).
If the error rate is higher than a predetermined threshold, then Alice terminates the
protocol and restarts from Step 1. Otherwise, the protocol continues to the next step.
Step 6. As for the secret sharing policy in the case (1) of Table 1, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd
qubits of GHZ-like states are measured by Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively, using
Z-basis. They can transform these measurement results into three binary bit sequences,
in which the result is ’0’ if |0〉 and ’1’ if |1〉. After the transformation, Alice, Bob, and
Charlie will obtain a key bit string KA, KB, and KC, respectively, which conform to the
secret sharing relationship, i.e., KA = KB ⊕KC.
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Table 1: The actions taken by the secret dealer Alice in each case.
Case Bob Charlie Alice
(1) SHARE SHARE ACTION (i)
(2) SHARE CHECK ACTION (ii)
(3) CHECK SHARE ACTION (iii)
(4) CHECK CHECK ACTION (iv)
(i): Alice measures her own qubit with Z-basis.
(ii): Alice performs Bell measurement on her qubit and Charlie’s returned qubit.
(iii): Alice performs Bell measurement on her qubit and Bob’s returned qubit.
(iv): Alice performs an appropriate three-qubit joint measurement on her qubit and the returned qubits.
The randomization-based SQSS protocol uses the entanglement correlation of GHZ-like
state |ψ ′〉 to achieve the goal of secret sharing. In this type of protocol, the agents will directly
perform Z-basis measurement on the photons in the SHARE mode. Conversely, by modifying
the operations performed by the agents, Li et al. further proposed the other scheme called the
measure-resend SQSS protocol, which will be described in Sec. 2.2.
2.2 Measure-resend SQSS protocol
Similar to Sec. 2.1, the measure-resend SQSS scheme is also reviewed under a three-party
scenario (i.e., a boss Alice, and two agents: Bob and Charlie). The modified steps (*) are
depicted in detail as follows. The other steps are the same as those described in Sec. 2.1 and
thus are omitted here.
(*Step 2) There are two modes (i.e., SHARE and CHECK) that Bob and Charlie can decide
to perform on each received photon. For the CHECK mode, the agent still reflects
the qubit back to Alice via different delay lines similar to Sec. 1. On the contrary,
in the SHARE mode, the agent measures the received qubits in Z-basis, and returns a
sequence of newly generated photons of the same states to Alice.
(*Step 3) Alice stores the photon sequences reflected from Bob and Charlie in a short-term
quantum memory, and publicly confirms the reception of them. Subsequently, Bob and
Charlie declare the positions of particles being measured and being reflected.
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(*Step 4) According to the agents’ reports, Alice can perform one of the four actions on her
own qubit and the corresponding qubits as depicted in Table 1.
The measure-resend SQSS protocol is also based on the entanglement correlation of the GHZ-
like state |ψ ′〉. The only difference between these two schemes (the randomization-based
SQSS and the measure-resend SQSS) is the type of operations allowed to perform by the
agent in the SHARE mode. Considering the eavesdropping check, both schemes discuss the
measurement result of each qubit in the GHZ-like state to detect the presence of eavesdrop-
pers. However, this check strategy may not be able to prevent Bob or Charlie from maliciously
launching attacks on the SQSS protocols. More details of the attacks will be discussed in Sec.
3.
3 Attacks and the improvements
This section shows that under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss and two agents) of
Li et al.’s scheme, a malicious agent is possible to launch an Intercept-resend attack on the
randomization-based SQSS and a Trojan horse attack [14, 15, 16, 17] on the measure-resend
SQSS to reveal the other agent’s shadow and further to derive Alice’s secret key. This con-
tradicts to the security requirements of a QSS. Fortunately, the above problems can be re-
spectively solved by a carefully designed eavesdropping check process and the use of some
special optical devices that filter out the spy photons of the Trojan horse attacks.
3.1 Attacks on Li et al.’s SQSS schemes
Both Bob and Charlie can act as a dishonest insider to derive Alice’s shared secret. In general,
an eavesdropper is assumed to be powerful enough to equip with any quantum devices.
3.1.1 The Intercept-resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS.
Suppose that Bob is a dishonest insider. He first intercepts the photon sequence SC (from
Alice to Charlie) in Step 1, and stores it in his quantum memory. Then, he prepares a new
photon sequence SE randomly chosen from |0〉 or |1〉, and sends it to Charlie, where SE is of
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the same length as SC. Notice that the wavelength of each photon in SE is set to be different
from the others so that Bob is alble to identify their individual position.
When Charlie receives the sequence SE in Step 2, he will perform Z-basis measurement
on those photons chosen for the SHARE mode, and reflect the ones that are chosen for the
CHECK mode via different delay lines. At this time, Bob can intercept the reflected sequence
(from Charlie to Alice), and replace those photons with the corresponding photons in SC and
then send them back to Alice. Bob is able to do so by distinguishing the wavelengths of the
reflected photons from Charlie.
Later, Bob deliberately selects the SHARE mode on those photons in SB that their corre-
sponding photons in SC have been chosen by Charlie as in the SHARE mode, and randomly
select SHARE or CHECK on the other photons in SB. The above action is to avoid the pres-
ence of the case (3) in Table 1 because it has a 50% probability of being detected. More
precisely, since all the SHARE photons measured by Charlie are the forged photons in SE ,
there is a 50% probability on each three-particle set of the case (3) that will not follow the
entanglement correlation of GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉= 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉).
For the eavesdropping check, Bob can escape from detection because of all the reflected
photons in cases (1), (2), and (4) of Table 1 are indeed generated by Alice. Therefore, he
can obtain Charlie’s shadow KC by measuring the SHARE photons in SC, and further derive
Alice’s secret key with KB ⊕KC = KA.
3.1.2 The Trojan-horse attack on the measure-resend SQSS.
Let us also assume here that Bob is a malicious insider. He first attaches some invisible
photons ST on each particle of SC transmitted from Alice to Charlie in Step 1, and then
inserts some delay photons SD in the same time window to each particle of SC. Notice that
the wavelength in each photon of SD is set to be the same as the corresponding photon in SC,
whereas the wavelength in each photon of ST is close to the corresponding photon in SC.
When Charlie receives the sequence SC in Step 2, he measures those photons in the
SHARE mode with Z-basis, and returns a sequence of newly generated photons of the same
states to Alice. The corresponding photons of the SHARE photons in ST and SD will vanish
after the replacement of the newly produced photons. As for the CHECK photons, Charlie
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will directly reflect them without any reordering operation to Alice. At this time, Bob can
intercept the returned sequence (from Charlie to Alice), and perform Z-basis measurement on
those photons that their corresponding spy photons have disappeared.
After the measurement, Bob resends the returned sequence back to Alice without any
further action. Since Alice will also perform Z-basis measurement on the SHARE photons
of Charlie in Step 4, the measurement results will not be different from the ones measured
by Bob. Hence, the three cases (1), (2), and (3) in Table 1 used for the eavesdropping check
will not detect the attack. Bob can obtain Charlie’s shadow KC by those Z-basis measurement
results of the SHARE photons in the case (4) of Table 1 and further derive Alice’s secret key
with KB ⊕KC = KA.
3.2 Possible solutions for the attacks
Two solutions to avoid the attacks are proposed here. The first one is to set a new threshold of
eavesdropping check in the randomization-based SQSS. The second solution is to equip with
some special optical filter devices to detect the Trojan horse attacks on the measure-resend
SQSS.
Solution 1. A new threshold for the eavesdropping check.
In Table 1, all four cases should be evenly distributed. However, if Bob performs the intercept-
resend attack as shown in Sec. 3.1.1, there is no chance for case (3) of Table 1 to appear. Thus,
to prevent this attack, before the eavesdropping check of Step 5, Alice can first calculate the
occurrence ρ of case (3) in Table 1, and decide the existence of the attack. If ρ is too small,
then Alice can abort the protocol.
Solution 2. Agents install some optical filter devices.
Since the attack in Sec. 3.1.2 is based on the spy photons in the Trojan horse attacks, when
Charlie receives the photons in Step 2, he can equip with some special optical devices such
as the wavelength quantum filter and the photon number splitters (PNS) to detect the attacks.
According to [14, 15, 16, 17], the wavelength quantum filter can eliminate the invisible pho-
tons attached on the legitimate ones, and the PNS can spit each legitimate particle to discover
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the delay photons. If there is an irrational high rate of multi-photon signal, then Charlie
announces to restart the protocol from Step 1.
4 Conclusions
This paper has pointed out two attacks on both of Li et al.’s SQSS schemes, respectively.
Under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss and two agents), a malicious insider could
possibly launch the Intercept-resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS and the Trojan
horse attacks on the measure-resend SQSS to obtain the other agent’s shadow, which can also
lead to derive the boss’s secret key. Fortunately, two solutions are given in this paper to avoid
the attacks (i.e., one is to add a new threshold for the eavesdropping check, and the other is
to equip with some special optical devices to filter out the spy photons). With the second
solution, since near a half of the transmitted photons are used in devices to detect the Trojan
horse attack for each agent, the qubit efficiency will be seriously jeopardized. Hence, how
to design a QSS protocol which is congenitally free from this attack is a promising future
research.
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sharing (SQSS) protocols using GHZ-like states. The proposed schemes are rather practi-
cal because only the secret dealer requires to equip with advanced quantum devices such
as quantum memory, whereas the other agents can merely perform classical operations to
complete the secret sharing. However, this study points out that a security pitfall exists in
the eavesdropping check phase of both schemes that could mount to an Intercept-resend
attack and a Trojan horse attack on the two schemes, respectively, to disclose the other
agent’s shadow, and further to reveal the master key of the SQSS, which contradicts to the
security requirement of a QSS. Fortunately, two possible solutions are proposed to avoid
this security pitfall.
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1 Introduction
Since the first quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol was presented by Mark et al.’s via triplet
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state in 1999 [1], lots of QSS schemes have also been
proposed [2-13]. The main goal of a QSS is to distribute a secret among several agents based
on the quantum mechanics. Only when enough subsets of legitimate agents cooperate can the
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secret be recovered. On the contrary, any agent alone is not able to acquire the dealer’s secret
by his/her own shadow. A secure QSS should be able to avoid the attack from both an outside
eavesdropper and an inside malicious user.
Recently, Li et al. proposed two novel semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocols via
triplet GHZ-like state [13]. According to their definition, the term “semi-quantum” implies
that the secret dealer is a powerful quantum server, whereas the other agents are all classical
clients. More precisely, the secret dealer has the ability to perform the following operations:
(1) preparing GHZ-like state, (2) performing the Bell measurement and the three-qubit joint
measurement, (3) storing photons in a short-term quantum memory. As for the classical
agents, they are restricted to perform the following operations over the quantum channel: (1)
preparing new qubits in the classical basis {|0〉, |1〉}, (2) measuring photons in the classi-
cal basis, (3) reordering the photons via different delay lines, (4) sending or reflecting the
qubits without disturbance. Since the classical basis only considers the qubit |0〉 and |1〉, the
other quantum superpositions of single photon are not included here. Therefore, the agents’
operations above are equivalent to the traditional {0, 1} computation.
The two protocols proposed by Li et al. [13] are namely the randomization-based SQSS
and the measure-resend SQSS, respectively. Both schemes are based on the entanglement cor-
relation of GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉)= 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉),
which can be easily generated by performing the Hadamard gate H (= 1√2 (|0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|+
|1〉〈0|− |1〉〈1|)) on each qubit of the standard GHZ state |Ψ1〉= 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉). Under
the three-party QSS scenario, it can be seen that if each party holds the 1st, the 2nd, and the
3rd particle of a GHZ-like state, respectively, then their classical-basis measurements (say
MR1, MR2, and MR3) will agree to a secret sharing relationship: MR1 = MR2 ⊕MR3, where
the measurement result is encoded as ’0’ if |0〉, ’1’ if |1〉.
However, this study attempts to show that under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss
and two agents) of Li et al.’s scheme, a malicious agent is possible to launch an Intercept-
resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS and a Trojan horse attack [14, 15, 16, 17] on
the measure-resend SQSS to reveal the other agent’s shadow. This contradicts to the security
requirements of a QSS. Fortunately, the above problems can be respectively solved by a
carefully designed eavesdropping check process and the use of some special optical devices
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that filter out the spy photons of the Trojan horse attacks.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews Li et al.’s two SQSS
schemes via GHZ-like state. Section 3 points out the problem and gives two solutions to
remedy the loophole. Finally, Section 4 gives a brief conclusion to the result.
2 Review of Li et al.’s SQSS schemes
In this section, a brief review of Li et al.’s two SQSS schemes is given. The only difference be-
tween these two schemes is the definition of the classical agent’s ability. For a randomization-
based SQSS protocol, classical agents are limited to perform operations: (2), (3), and (4),
while in a measure-resend protocol, classical agents are limited to perform operations: (1),
(2), and (4), as defined in Sec. 1.
2.1 Randomization-based SQSS protocol
In this subsection, the SQSS is considered under a three-party scenario as follows. Suppose a
boss Alice wants to share a secret with her two agents: Bob and Charlie. She splits her secret
key KA into two pieces of shadow key: KB and KC, which will deliver to Bob and Charlie,
respectively. Only when Bob and Charlie collaborate can KA be recovered. The procedure of
the randomization-based SQSS can be described in the following steps:
Step 1. Alice first prepares N triplet GHZ-like states all in |ψ ′〉= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉).
Here, the quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉} can be classically measured by Z basis. Then, she
divides these N GHZ-like states into three sequences SA, SB, and SC, which include the
1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd particles of all GHZ-like states, respectively. After the above
preparation, Alice retains the quantum sequence SA, and sends the sequence SB to Bob,
SC to Charlie.
Step 2. When Bob and Charlie receive the photons, respectively, they choose to adopt either
the SHARE mode or the CHECK mode on each qubit, respectively. In the SHARE
mode, the agent performs a Z-basis measurement on the qubit, whereas in the CHECK
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mode, the agent reflects the qubit back to Alice. Notice that those returned qubits in
the CHECK mode are reordered via different delay lines.
Step 3. Alice stores the reflected qubits from Bob and Charlie in a short-term quantum mem-
ory, and publicly announces the reception of these photon sequences. After that, Bob
and Charlie publish the correct order of the reflected qubits, and their original positions
in the sequences delivered by Alice, respectively. According to the agents’ reports,
Alice can recover the reflected qubits into the correct order.
Step 4. For each GHZ-like state, both Bob and Charlie announce their decisions respectively
on the corresponding two particles of SB and SC, which can be one of the four cases as
shown in Table 1. Then, Alice can perform one of the four actions on the corresponding
qubits as depicted in Table 1.
Step 5. For the eavesdropping check, those qubits in cases (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1 are pub-
licly discussed. The involved parties have to publish their measurement results in those
cases to see whether each corresponding three qubits is consistent to the correlation of a
GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉 (= 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉) = 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉)).
If the error rate is higher than a predetermined threshold, then Alice terminates the
protocol and restarts from Step 1. Otherwise, the protocol continues to the next step.
Step 6. As for the secret sharing policy in the case (1) of Table 1, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd
qubits of GHZ-like states are measured by Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively, using
Z-basis. They can transform these measurement results into three binary bit sequences,
in which the result is ’0’ if |0〉 and ’1’ if |1〉. After the transformation, Alice, Bob, and
Charlie will obtain a key bit string KA, KB, and KC, respectively, which conform to the
secret sharing relationship, i.e., KA = KB ⊕KC.
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Table 1: The actions taken by the secret dealer Alice in each case.
Case Bob Charlie Alice
(1) SHARE SHARE ACTION (i)
(2) SHARE CHECK ACTION (ii)
(3) CHECK SHARE ACTION (iii)
(4) CHECK CHECK ACTION (iv)
(i): Alice measures her own qubit with Z-basis.
(ii): Alice performs Bell measurement on her qubit and Charlie’s returned qubit.
(iii): Alice performs Bell measurement on her qubit and Bob’s returned qubit.
(iv): Alice performs an appropriate three-qubit joint measurement on her qubit and the returned qubits.
The randomization-based SQSS protocol uses the entanglement correlation of GHZ-like
state |ψ ′〉 to achieve the goal of secret sharing. In this type of protocol, the agents will directly
perform Z-basis measurement on the photons in the SHARE mode. Conversely, by modifying
the operations performed by the agents, Li et al. further proposed the other scheme called the
measure-resend SQSS protocol, which will be described in Sec. 2.2.
2.2 Measure-resend SQSS protocol
Similar to Sec. 2.1, the measure-resend SQSS scheme is also reviewed under a three-party
scenario (i.e., a boss Alice, and two agents: Bob and Charlie). The modified steps (*) are
depicted in detail as follows. The other steps are the same as those described in Sec. 2.1 and
thus are omitted here.
(*Step 2) There are two modes (i.e., SHARE and CHECK) that Bob and Charlie can decide
to perform on each received photon. For the CHECK mode, the agent still reflects
the qubit back to Alice via different delay lines similar to Sec. 1. On the contrary,
in the SHARE mode, the agent measures the received qubits in Z-basis, and returns a
sequence of newly generated photons of the same states to Alice.
(*Step 3) Alice stores the photon sequences reflected from Bob and Charlie in a short-term
quantum memory, and publicly confirms the reception of them. Subsequently, Bob and
Charlie declare the positions of particles being measured and being reflected.
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(*Step 4) According to the agents’ reports, Alice can perform one of the four actions on her
own qubit and the corresponding qubits as depicted in Table 1.
The measure-resend SQSS protocol is also based on the entanglement correlation of the GHZ-
like state |ψ ′〉. The only difference between these two schemes (the randomization-based
SQSS and the measure-resend SQSS) is the type of operations allowed to perform by the
agent in the SHARE mode. Considering the eavesdropping check, both schemes discuss the
measurement result of each qubit in the GHZ-like state to detect the presence of eavesdrop-
pers. However, this check strategy may not be able to prevent Bob or Charlie from maliciously
launching attacks on the SQSS protocols. More details of the attacks will be discussed in Sec.
3.
3 Attacks and the improvements
This section shows that under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss and two agents) of
Li et al.’s scheme, a malicious agent is possible to launch an Intercept-resend attack on the
randomization-based SQSS and a Trojan horse attack [14, 15, 16, 17] on the measure-resend
SQSS to reveal the other agent’s shadow and further to derive Alice’s secret key. This con-
tradicts to the security requirements of a QSS. Fortunately, the above problems can be re-
spectively solved by a carefully designed eavesdropping check process and the use of some
special optical devices that filter out the spy photons of the Trojan horse attacks.
3.1 Attacks on Li et al.’s SQSS schemes
Both Bob and Charlie can act as a dishonest insider to derive Alice’s shared secret. In general,
an eavesdropper is assumed to be powerful enough to equip with any quantum devices [18,
19, 20]. Hence, the malicious classical agent is able to perform any operation as defined in
Sec. 1.
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3.1.1 The Intercept-resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS.
Suppose that Bob is a dishonest insider. He first intercepts the photon sequence SC (from
Alice to Charlie) in Step 1, and stores it in his quantum memory. Then, he prepares a new
photon sequence SE randomly chosen from |0〉 or |1〉, and sends it to Charlie, where SE is of
the same length as SC. Notice that the wavelength of each photon in SE is set to be different
from the others so that Bob is alble to identify their individual position.
When Charlie receives the sequence SE in Step 2, he will perform Z-basis measurement
on those photons chosen for the SHARE mode, and reflect the ones that are chosen for the
CHECK mode via different delay lines. At this time, Bob can intercept the reflected sequence
(from Charlie to Alice), and replace those photons with the corresponding photons in SC and
then send them back to Alice. Bob is able to do so by distinguishing the wavelengths of the
reflected photons from Charlie.
Later, Bob deliberately selects the SHARE mode on those photons in SB that their corre-
sponding photons in SC have been chosen by Charlie as in the SHARE mode, and randomly
select SHARE or CHECK on the other photons in SB. The above action is to avoid the pres-
ence of the case (3) in Table 1 because it has a 50% probability of being detected. More
precisely, since all the SHARE photons measured by Charlie are the forged photons in SE ,
there is a 50% probability on each three-particle set of the case (3) that will not follow the
entanglement correlation of GHZ-like state |ψ ′〉= 1√2 (|0〉 |φ+〉+ |1〉 |ψ+〉).
For the eavesdropping check, Bob can escape from detection because of all the reflected
photons in cases (1), (2), and (4) of Table 1 are indeed generated by Alice. Therefore, he
can obtain Charlie’s shadow KC by measuring the SHARE photons in SC, and further derive
Alice’s secret key with KB ⊕KC = KA.
3.1.2 The Trojan-horse attack on the measure-resend SQSS.
Let us also assume here that Bob is a malicious insider. He first attaches some invisible
photons [15, 17] ST on each particle of SC transmitted from Alice to Charlie in Step 1, and
then inserts some delay photons [15, 16] SD in the same time window to each particle of SC.
Notice that the wavelength in each photon of SD is set to be the same as the corresponding
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photon in SC, whereas the wavelength in each photon of ST is close to the corresponding
photon in SC.
When Charlie receives the sequence SC in Step 2, he measures those photons in the
SHARE mode with Z-basis, and returns a sequence of newly generated photons of the same
states to Alice. The corresponding photons of the SHARE photons in ST and SD will vanish
after the replacement of the newly produced photons. As for the CHECK photons, Charlie
will directly reflect them without any reordering operation to Alice. At this time, Bob can
intercept the returned sequence (from Charlie to Alice), and perform Z-basis measurement on
those photons that their corresponding spy photons have disappeared.
After the measurement, Bob resends the returned sequence back to Alice without any
further action. Since Alice will also perform Z-basis measurement on the SHARE photons
of Charlie in Step 4, the measurement results will not be different from the ones measured
by Bob. Hence, the three cases (1), (2), and (3) in Table 1 used for the eavesdropping check
will not detect the attack. Bob can obtain Charlie’s shadow KC by those Z-basis measurement
results of the SHARE photons in the case (4) of Table 1 and further derive Alice’s secret key
with KB ⊕KC = KA.
3.2 Possible solutions for the attacks
Two solutions to avoid the attacks are proposed here. The first one is to set a new threshold of
eavesdropping check in the randomization-based SQSS. The second solution is to equip with
some special optical filter devices to detect the Trojan horse attacks on the measure-resend
SQSS.
Solution 1. A new threshold for the eavesdropping check.
In Table 1, all four cases should be evenly distributed. However, if Bob performs the intercept-
resend attack as shown in Sec. 3.1.1, there is no chance for case (3) of Table 1 to appear. Thus,
to prevent this attack, before the eavesdropping check of Step 5, Alice can first calculate the
occurrence ρ of case (3) in Table 1, and decide the existence of the attack. If ρ is too small,
then Alice can abort the protocol.
Solution 2. Agents install some optical filter devices.
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Since the attack in Sec. 3.1.2 is based on the spy photons in the Trojan horse attacks, when
Charlie receives the photons in Step 2, he can equip with some special optical devices such
as the wavelength quantum filter and the photon number splitters (PNS) to detect the attacks.
According to [14, 15, 16, 17], the wavelength quantum filter can eliminate the invisible pho-
tons attached on the legitimate ones, and the PNS can spit each legitimate particle to discover
the delay photons. If there is an irrational high rate of multi-photon signal, then Charlie
announces to restart the protocol from Step 1.
4 Conclusions
This paper has pointed out two attacks on both of Li et al.’s SQSS schemes, respectively.
Under the three-party scenario (i.e., one boss and two agents), a malicious insider could
possibly launch the Intercept-resend attack on the randomization-based SQSS and the Trojan
horse attacks on the measure-resend SQSS to obtain the other agent’s shadow, which can also
lead to derive the boss’s secret key. Fortunately, two solutions are given in this paper to avoid
the attacks (i.e., one is to add a new threshold for the eavesdropping check, and the other is
to equip with some special optical devices to filter out the spy photons). With the second
solution, since near a half of the transmitted photons are used in devices to detect the Trojan
horse attack for each agent, the qubit efficiency will be seriously jeopardized. Hence, how
to design a QSS protocol which is congenitally free from this attack is a promising future
research.
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